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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment, which denied the
Fuquay Appellant's claim to an alleged prescriptive easement in a private roadway, King Lane,
which crosses the King Respondents' ranch property, Heart K Ranch. The King Respondents had
argued that on the basis ofldaho's "joint-use-in-common" rule, the Fuquay Appellants' use of King
Lane at all times had been permissive since the time King Lane had been first constructed for the
Kings' own use in 1973. This presumed "permissive use" eliminated the required elements of proof
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, that the claim be both "adverse," and asserted as a
"matter of right," such that the Kings were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This proceeding was commenced by the Fuquay Appellants by a complaint for prescriptive
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easement and motion

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed on September

14.

13-59). The declarations filed by Raymond Jayo, (R., pp. 60-61 ); John Fuquay, (R., pp. 62-66) and
Matthew Cleverley, (R., pp. 67-68), were submitted in support of the issuance of the TRO, which
\Vas heard by the district court by telephonic hearing on September 5, 2014, with a TRO issued by
the district court on that date. (R., pg. 2).
On September 9, 2014 the King Defendants answered the Fuquays' Complaint and asserted
counterclaims requesting declaratory relief as to the scope of any permissive use by the Fuquays on
King Lane; requesting permanent injunctive relief; and requesting quiet title relief (R., pp. 69-83).
On September 17, 2014 the Low Defendants also filed an answer and asserted counterclaims for
trespass and injunctive relief (R., 113-121).
In rebuttal to the relief that had been obtained by the Fuquays through the issuance of the
temporary restraining order (TRO) on September 5, 2014, and in opposition to any further injunctive
relief, as requested by the Fuquays, and as set for hearing on September 18, 2014, the Kings had
submitted the affidavits of Denice Collett (school bus driver), (R., pp. 84-86); Rose King, (R., pp.
87-94); Gilbert King, (R., pp., 95-104); Ronald P. Rainey, (R., pp. 105-107); Declaration of Shawn
Drew (Schwann Delivery Person), (R., pp. 108-09); Scott Snyder, Owyhee County Deputy Sheriff
(R., pp. 122-127); and Seth Thomas, (R., pp. 128-131). In addition, the Respondent Lows submitted
the Affidavit of Susie Low as to her observations concerning the existence of gates across King Lane
and the purpose served by those gates in controlling livestock. (R., pp. 110-112).
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for

a preliminary

was

on September 18, 2014 at

time both the opposing affidavits and live testimony was presented to the district court, which court
then addressed the primary basis for both the issuance of the TRO, and any continuing necessity on
that same basis, for the entr; of a preliminary injunction, ,vhich requested injunctive relief ,vas
denied, with only a limited exception recognized for the use of King Lane by emergency vehicles.
An "Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction," was entered on September 29,
2014. (R., pg. 4) (R., pg. 272, Tr. pg. 122, LL 4-17).
After the hearing conducted on September 18, 2014, on the Fuquays' motion for preliminary
injunction, the September 5, 2014 TRO was quashed and the only injunctive relief ordered for any
"use" of King Lane was such "use" as was necessary for emergency vehicle access. (R., pp. 272-73,
incorporating the September 18, 2014 hearing transcript; Tr., pg, 123 L. 125 to pg. 124, LL. 1-8)
("You're going to have to make the long route around until we style this case for trial and have a
hearing. Until then, you got to make the long route." Tr., pg. 122, LL. 13-16, R., pg. 272).
After the preliminary injunction hearing, on October 29, 2014 the Fuquay Appellants
proceeded to file a motion for partial summary judgment as brought only against the Low
Respondents (R., pp. 132-143), to which the Lows responded, (R., pp. 215-228), as supported by the
Affidavit of Rose King, (R., pp. 229-235); and by the Affidavit of the Low's predecessor in interest,
Sam Steiner. (R., pp. 236-39). This summary judgment motion was subsequently withdrawn by the
Fuquays on December 17, 2014. (R., pp 274-75). The significance of this particular motion is that
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it was at

point

the Fuquays described

scope

use

their

prescriptive

easement claims over King Lane as encompassing regular personal vehicle access, regular use for
driving large semi-trucks, regular farm use for cattle trucks and moving farm equipment, pedestrian
use, and personal vehicular use by guests. (R., pg. 136). All of these alleged prescriptive easement
uses were supported by the Declaration of John Fuquay. (R., pg. 201-214 ).
On January 28, 2015 the Fuquay Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, primarily to add a new party, Michael and Teena Lewis, who owned property located off
of Castle Lane. This proposed amended complaint otherwise neither amended any of the existing
claims, nor added any new claims, as alleged against the existing King and Low Defendants. (R. pg.
6). Because the proposed addition of the Lewis Defendants would not assist in resolving the existing
claims as made against the King Defendants, and would potentially complicate the resolution of
those claims by injecting new issues concerning the prohibited assertion of prescriptive easement
claims over public BLM roadways, the King Defendants opposed the addition of those claims and
that new party to the action below.
The district court did grant the Fuquays limited leave to file an amended complaint, but
without adding the proposed Lewis Defendants as new parties to the action. On March 30, 2015 the
Fuquays filed their First Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 432-485). In paragraph 16 of that amended
complaint the Fuquays continued to make no allegation of any "use" of King Lane arising before
1989, and continued to raise no claim as to any "use" of King Lane by any "predecessors" upon
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use the Fuquays based

own prescriptive right claim. (R., pg. 436).

One day after the Fuquays filed that motion for leave to amend, the Kings on January 29,
2015 moved for summary judgment, essentially on the ground that the Fuquays could not prove a

Kings were entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on that prescriptive easement claim. (R., pp. 29193). This motion was supported by the affidavits of Gilbert and Rose King; (R., pp. 276-84); by the
affidavit of counsel; (R., pp. 285-290); the supporting memorandum of the Lows; (R., pp. 308-31 O);
and by the Kings own supporting memoranda; (R., pp. 294-307; 414-422). The Fuquays opposed
the King's motion for summary judgment not by addressing the issue raised on the motion that the
required element of adverseness could not be established - but instead by simply ignoring that
argument altogether. (R., pp. 311-327). The Fuquays then resubmitted all of the previous testimony
of the parties to the action in an attempt to substantiate its summary judgment opposition argument
that genuine issues of fact existed which precluded entry of summary judgment. (R., pp. 328-413 ).
The matter was heard by the district court on February 27, 2015. (R., pg. 6). On March 25,
2015 the district court issued its memorandum decision denying the King's motion for summary
judgment, (R., pp. 423-431 ), ruling that there was a material issue of fact as to when adverse use
began. (R., pg. 430).
On April 7, 2015 the Kings moved for reconsideration under Civil Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), (R., pp.
490-92), arguing that the district court had missed the essence of the point raised on their summary
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judgment motion that from the time King Lane had been built

1973 all use by the Fuquays had

been permissive - as a matter of law - under the "joint-use-in-common-rule," and that the Fuquays
had completely failed to provide any evidence of an interfering use that would constitute an adverse
11<:P rPqnirPrl in -:uppmt ofthPir prP<:rriptivP right rlaim-:.

(R ., pp.

4QQ_.:; 16). Tn

::i

-;hmt rP-;pon<:P thP

Fuquays continued to adhere to their previous position that disputed facts, notwithstanding the lack
of evidence in support of a required element of their claim, dictated that summary judgment be
denied. (R., pp. 517-522). In reply the Kings continued to point out that the record before the
district court simply failed to support the existence of any adverse claim made by the Fuquays
against the Kings that would support a right to a prescriptive easement in King Lane. (R., pp. 523535).
On reconsideration the district court granted the King's motion for summary judgment on
June 19, 2015. (R., pp. 536-547). Then on July 6, 2015 the Fuquays filed their own motion for
reconsideration, and for the first time in the proceeding below argued on that motion that they were
entitled to a presumption of adverseness on their claim to a prescriptive easement in King Lane
because it was unknown when the "use" of King Lane that they were claiming had originated by any
of their predecessors. (R., pp. 548-570). On August 4, 2015 the King Defendants opposed the
Fuquays' motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Fuquays had mis-stated both the facts and
applicable Idaho legal standards, (R., pp. 602-13), that applied to the "joint use in common" doctrine.
The Fuquays submitted a reply memorandum on August 15, 2015, continuing to adhere to their
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when

is no

road began a

adverseness applies. (R., pp. 616-621 ).
On September 11, 2015 the district court issued a memorandum decision denying the
F11q1rny-:' motion for rPron-:ir1PrMion, (R ., pp. 6')Q_f/~6), finning thM thf' Pvir1Pnrf' ur::i-: 11n11i-:pntf't1

that King Lane had been constructed by the Kings in 1973 and that the Fuquays' use of that roadway
had in no way interfered with the Kings' own use of that roadway, such that the Fuquays' use was
presumed to be permissive under the "joint use in common" doctrine. (R., pp. 634-35).
The Respondent Lows had submitted their own motion for partial summary judgment on July
15, 2015, (R., pp. 592-94), requesting entry of summary judgment on the same basis as it had been
granted to the Kings, as supported by both a memorandum, (R., pp. 595-601), and a reply
memorandum. (R., pp. 622-28).

Following the determination of the Fuquays' motion for

reconsideration, the district court also granted the Lows' motion for summary judgment on
September 21, 2015. (R., pp. 637-641).
A judgment was entered on December 21, 2015. (R., pp. 642-43). The Fuquays filed an
initial notice of appeal, (R., pp. 644-650), which was dismissed on the basis that it did not constitute
an appealable final judgment, due to the fact that the counterclaims of the Defendant Kings and Lows
still remained pending and unadjudicated before the district court. (R., pp. 651-52). With some
additional briefing provided by the parties, (R., pp. 653-661), the district court on March 29, 2016
filed a Memorandum Decision Upon Request for Final Judgment that disposed of the pending
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counterclaims, (R.,

665-67), and then entered an Amended

Judgment

pp. 663-64).

The Fuquay Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on May 2, 2016. (R., pp. 668-674).
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

previously submitted through the affidavit of Gilbert King (R., pp. 95-104), two Google Earth
images are attached at the end of this respondents' brief that generally represent the respective
properties of the parties to this appeal in relation to the Oreana Loop Road, Castle Lane, and King
Lane, and that specifically represent King Lane in relation to the properties of the parties to this
appeal. 1
The Fuquay Appellants have alleged a prescriptive easement claim to an all weather private
road known as "King Lane," which is about a half mile in length, that runs in an east-west direction
between the public Oreana Loop Road and Castle Lane. After King Lane connects with Castle Lane,
that roadway then turns south and reconnects with the public Oreana Loop Road. This private
roadway was named "King Lane" in 2002 in response to a request from Owyhee County Sheriff Gary

As a part of their opposition of the Fuquays' Motion for Leave to Amend their
Complaint, the Kings had argued that as based upon the existing facts on the ground it was quite
possible that the Fuquays had an enforceable alternative legal access to their properties over Castle
Lane which enforceable alternative legal access was likely an, "R.S. 2477 right-of-way," as
preserved under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), P.L. 94-579,
90 Stat. 2792. See e.g., Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Fremont County, 157
Idaho 937,342 P.3d 649 (2015). Because the existence of an alternative right of way is not a defense
to a claim of a prescriptive easement, that briefing has not been made a part of the record on this
appeal.
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responders,

accurate

2014 Rose King Aff., ,I 4, R., pg. 230).
The King Respondents own the parcel of land north of King Lane and the Respondent Lows

west of King Lane, where that roadway ends and connects with Castle Lane. As the district court
declared, in its ruling on the Lows' motion for summary judgment, "It is not specifically known to
what extent the road crosses the Low and King properties, but there is no dispute that the road cross
a portion of each." Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at pg. 2 (R., pg. 638).
The district court granted summary judgment for the respondent landowners, the Kings and
the Lows, denying the Fuquay Appellants' prescriptive easement claim in King Lane. The basis for
that ruling was that from the time this road - King Lane

was first built by the Kings in 1973, the

only evidence submitted in supp01i of its "use," concerning the Fuquays' prescriptive easement
claims was the "use" that had been submitted by the Appellant Fuquays, which "use" was entirely
permissive having been undertaken "in common" with the Kings, as owners of the road, which "use"
had been commenced no earlier than 1977. (R., pp. 545-46; R., pp. 634-35).
The Fuquays' alleged prescriptive easement claims, as primarily supp01ied by the Declaration
of John Fuquay, (R., pg. 201-214), were declared to be for the following types of uses: (I) regular
personal vehicle access; (2) regular use by large semi-trucks; (3) regular farm use by cattle trucks
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farm equipment;

use;and

use

of the

Fuquays (R., pg. 136).
On the record before this Court it is undisputed that the Respondent Kings acquired their

that is now known as King Lane. (Rose King Aff., ,i 2, R., pg. 230). This roadway did not become
suitable for usage by large trucks prior to 1989, when the "welded barrel culvert" was replaced with
a concrete culvert. (Rose King Aff., ,i,i 3 & 16, R., pp. 230 & 233-34). It is also undisputed that the
Lows, who are the adjacent landowners to the Kings and own the property on the south side of King
Lane, acquired their property interest in 2006 from their predecessor

Sam Steiner (R., pg. 626).

It is also undisputed by their own declarations that the Appellant Fuquays' own use of King
Lane did not begin at any time before 1977. (Declaration of John Fuquay, R., pp. 201-14).
Nonetheless, the essence of the claims they have advanced on this appeal is well summed-up in a
single paragraph provided in the reply brief that they submitted in support of their motion for
reconsideration to the district court:
In this case, the evidence shows that the roadway has been in existence for
nearly 100 years and was used by the property owners prior to the Plaintiffs. There
is no evidence that the initial use of the roadway was ever permissive. Therefore the
use of the roadway from its inception, including the time through Plaintiffs
predecessors, is presumed to be adverse to the Kings. The Kings have the burden of
showing permissive use at the time the roadway was built and use began, not just
from the Fuquays' s first use in 1977. The Kings have not shown any evidence that
the initial use nearly 100 years ago was permissive; therefore, the presumption is that
the use has been adverse.
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Plaintiffs' Reply

Support of Motion

Reconsideration at pg. 3

pg. 618).

There is no evidence in the record before this Court on this Appeal, just as there was
not evidence before that district court, that supports any of the above-stated assertions, and
it was for that reason that the district ~nmt rlPniPrl thf'. F11q1rny AppPlhnt-:' motion for
reconsideration. The district court ruled:
In this case, it is undisputed that the Kings began improving the roadway,
which is now King Lane, in 1973 to benefit their farming operation. In her affidavit,
Rose King stated that at the time of their purchase of this property in 1973, "King
Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet and muddy most of the
year. . . . We desired to access our fields through the use of this filed [sic, "field"]
lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks to build a base for this road so that it would
be passable for our farm equipment. We did this annually .... " Affidavit of Rose
King, pg. 2, filed Dec. 9, 2014. Thus, the Kings constructed the roadway for their
own use and convenience. The law applicable here is that "the mere use thereof by
others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of
license or permission." Simmons v. Perkins, supra. Therefore, the permissive
presumption is applicable here.
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6, 2015, at pp. 6-7
(R., pp. 634-35).
The only facts alleged by the Fuquay Appellants in support of their claim to a presumption
of adverse right in the use of King Lane is a single excerpt from the deposition of Rose King upon
which they also relied in their argument before the district court (R., pg. 561 ), and the rather
indefinite statements of the Lows' predecessor, Sam Steiner, as to what he saw as being the rather
intermittent use of King Lane in his observations over the years (R., pp. 561-62). This alleged
evidence of prior use, submitted by the Fuquays to establish a "presumption of adverse use," was
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rejected by the district court for the purpose

establishing

use of King

the

Fuquays' predecessors which allegedly commenced at some unknown time. Rose King's deposition
excerpt did nothing more than establish the location of the Kings' property boundaries:
A.
Tt gopc; right whPrP it ic: torh1y. Tt ic: thP c:::imP <:pot. Tt h::ic:n't movPrl.
That lane goes to where the fence - - the gate is because those fences are all the
border lines. When we bought the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where we
live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they took us around to show us the
borderline, and if you will look, the fence goes all the way across what's between Cal
and Susie's and then it comes right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That same
fence. And then it turns and goes south.

(R., pg. 561; Deposition of Rose King at pp. 15-16, R, pg. 574). Likewise, the observations made
by Sam Steiner, who was two years old when his family first moved onto the property in 1959
(Steiner Aff., ,i 2, R., pg. 237), are indefinite as to his time of observation and could be equally
consistent with uses made of King Lane after the improvements to the road were made in 1973:
6.
Sometimes hunters used it to go back to the reservoir on the BLM
ground. Kings used it to go to the geothermal well they had leased on the BLM
ground. Renters on the old Munger property, now owned by Fuquays and previously
owned by Bob Collett used it occasionally as a short-cut to Grand View. I think that
Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile home located near the
rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay. Jim and John Fuquay lived in the old
Foreman farm residence down by the Foreman Reservoir for many years and while
they generally drove out Castle Road, they also used the lane as a short-cut to Grand
View. When Jim Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the corner of what would be
King Lane and Castle Road, he would occasionally use King Lane, probably as a
short-cut when he went out to Grand View.
7.
However, the majority of the vehicle use was down Castle Road to
Oreana Loop Road to the west. This was especially true during wet weather because
there is a slough at the common west corner of the Fouquay [sic], Low's and King's
properties that was pretty muddy in wet weather. It was pretty difficult to get through
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then. When
Block had the King property under contract,
some work on the lane one year.

and Jim Fuquay did

8.
While there was some use of King Lane by passenger vehicles and
pickup trucks, I don't believe I ever saw anyone take a large truck out that way,
logging trucks or cattle trucks. Those kind of vehicles always went out Castle Road.
However, T think th::it John Fnq1rny m::iy h::ive hmnght ::in empty r::ittle trnrk in th::it

way a few times.
Affidavit of Samuel V.C. Steiner at pg. 2, R., pg. 237
Therefore, as relevant to the nature and extent of the alleged prescriptive easement claims
that had been advanced by the Fuquay Appellants below, and on this appeal, there is no evidence in
the record before this Court that King Lane in its present "all-weather" configuration, as originally
constructed by the Kings in 1973 to support general farm and ranch vehicle traffic, and as not
suitable for any large truck traffic before 1989, either existed as anything other than a mere wet and
muddy path through the weeds before 1973, or that there was any "use" whatsoever made of that
roadway by any Fuquay predecessor prior to the commencement of their own use of the roadway in
1977 that is consistent with the prescriptive use claims that they made in the action below.
The "facts" which are submitted in support of the "use" of a prescriptive right claim must
provide evidence of "continuous and uninterrupted use" by the claimant, or a predecessor, for the
required prescriptive period. The only "facts" concerning any "use" of King Lane that were
submitted in this action in support of the alleged prescriptive right claims of the Fuquay Appellants
were those alleged "uses" that commenced in 1977 when John Fuquay purchased the property
adjoining the Kings, (Declaration of John Fuquay, R., pp. 201-14), and nothing before that time.
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D,

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal the appellate court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,

and applies the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Tiller White, LLC

v, Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, 160 Idaho 417,419,374 P,3d 580,582 (2016); and Idaho Dev,,
LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 152 Idaho 401, 404, 272 P.3d 373, 376 (2011) (quoting
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,441,235 P.3d 387,391 (2010)). A grant of
summary judgment is warranted where "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)).
Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's burden
may be satisfied by showing the absence of material fact with regard to any essential element of the
non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). The absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essential element of the plaintiffs
claim renders any other potential issues of fact irrelevant. Once the absence of sufficient evidence
on an element has been shown, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine issue
of material fact. The non-moving party cannot merely rely upon its pleadings, but must produce
affidavits, depositions, or other evidence establishing an issue of material fact. R. G. Nelson, A.IA.

v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990). The non-moving party need not submit
evidence on every element upon which it will bear the burden at trial, but only those elements about
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which the

party successfully

burden.

v. Idaho

, 126

Idaho 527,887 P.2d 1034 (1994).

II.
RF,SPONOF:NT'S RF:STATF.MFNT OF THF. TSSTTF.S RAISF.n ON APPFAT.

1.

Did the district court appropriately grant summary judgment to both the King
and Low Respondents by application of the "Joint Use In Common" rule in finding
upon undisputed facts that at all times the Fuquay Appellants' use of King Lane was
permissive, thus eliminating any possibility that the Fuquays could prevail upon their
prescriptive easement claim?

2.

If the King Respondents prevail on this appeal are they entitled to an award
of their costs, and an award of attorney's fees under LC. § 12-121?

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Correctly Applied The "Use In Common" Rule In Granting
Summary Judgment To The Respondents
The focal point of this appeal arises out of the district court's grant of summary judgment to

the King Respondents on June 19, 2015, and to the Low Respondents on September 21, 2015, on
the basis that the Fuquay Appellants' use of King Lane was undertaken within the scope of the
"joint-use-in-common-rule," and was therefore deemed to be entirely permissive. Consequently, in
granting the King and Low Respondents' motion for summary judgment, the district court denied
the Fuquay Appellants' claim for the recognition of a prescriptive easement over King Lane.
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"Because

1s no

thing to take

prescription are not favored by the law. Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 143, 118 P.2d 740, 744
(1941)." Hughesv. Fisher, 142Idaho474,480, 129P.3d 1223, 1229(2006);andLorangv. Hunt,
107 Idaho 802, 803, 693 P2d 448,449 (1984), A plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing
evidence each of the five required elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement as declared
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 700, 963 P.2d 383 (1998):
To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove by clear and
convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of
right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement
(5) for the statutory period. See I.C. § 5-203; Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 173,
16 P.3d 263, 270 (2000). Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial
court must make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a
judgment on appeal.
139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973 (emphasis added).
The King Respondents, as Defendants below, had requested summary judgment on the
Fuquay Appellants' claim to a prescriptive easement in King Lane on the basis that if at "all times"
the Fuquays' use of King Lane had been permissive, then their prescriptive easement claim would
fail for lack of any evidence in support of the required element of the claim being "adverse." The
applicable rule on summary judgment is that the absence of any evidence which is necessary to
establish an essential element of a claim that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial
necessarily renders all other potential issues of fact irrelevant. Bromleyv. Garey, 132 Idaho 807,
810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1999). (R., pp. 299-300; R., pp. 415-416). The Kings argued
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below that the Fuquays had failed to present any evidence establishing any adverse use of King Lane
for any claimed five year period, within the scope of their pleading. (R., pp. 300-305; R., pp. 418421 ). Consequently, in the absence of any evidence necessary to support of an essential element of
the Fuquay Appellants' prescriptive e::isement d::iim

the element of adverse

use-the district court

granted summary judgment for the King and Low Respondents, reasoning as follows:
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any
showing on the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse and
under claim of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the
plaintiffs, there is nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of
separate and exclusive use from 1977 until 2011. While the use of King Lane may
not have started with express or even implied permission, the record and testimony
of the plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with
the owner and the general public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons,
63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (194). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless
there is evidence of a decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be
considered an "actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner."
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480.
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of the
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership
rights of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use.
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a
genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to
do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,392, 179
P.3d 352, 355 (Ct.App.2008).
This court has reviewed the record throughly and cannot find that plaintiffs
have met this burden. Thus summary judgment is appropriate. This is especially so
given the plaintiffs burden of proof at trial (clear and convincing evidence).
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Memorandum Decision Upon

Defendants' Motion

1 (R., pp.

545-46) (italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added).
It was not until the Fuquay Appellants had filed their own motion for reconsideration of the

district court's 2:rant of summarv iud2:ment to the Kimm
and I ,ows. that for the first time anv issue
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emerged in this case that the Fuquays' use of King Lane should be "presumed to be adverse" on the
basis that there was no evidence as to how the use of King Lane began. (R., pp. 548-570).
In opposing the Fuquays' motion for reconsideration, the Kings presented evidence to the
district court which demonstrated that the Fuquays themselves had clearly established that their own
use of the King Lane had not begun at any time prior to 1977. (Declaration of John Fuquay, R., pg.
201-214). In addition, no evidence had been presented to the district court that any roadway, which
was suitable for vehicular traffic and that was consistent with the nature of the Fuquays' alleged
prescriptive easement claims, had existed at the current location of King Lane at any time before the
Kings constructed the current roadway in 1973. (R., pg. 230; Rose King Aff., ,r 2).
The statement of Samuel V.C. Steiner did not establish that there had been "any use"
whatsoever of any earlier tract or pathway at the present location of King Lane prior to the
construction of the current roadway in 1973 (R., pg. 237). Mr. Steiner, who was born in 1957, (R.,
pg. 237, Steiner Aff.,

,r 2),

simply testified that, "I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King

Lane." (R., pg. 237, Steiner Aff.,

,r 5).

Even Mr. Steiner's hearsay declaration as to what his dad

had told him is consistent with Rose King's own affidavit that some sort of"path through grass and
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Rose King Aff., ,r

weeds,

had existed at that location

to

current

construction in 1973. Steiner's testimony concerning his observations of occasional and irregular
use of King Lane, mostly by the Fuquays themselves, is otherwise indefinite as to the time that any
of this alleged use occurred. (R., pg. 237, Steiner Aff.

,r,r 6, 7, & 8).

The only other alleged evidence upon which the Fuquays rely in support of their argument
that any "prior use" of King Lane supports the existence of a presumption of adverseness upon which
they would be entitled to rely, consists of the statements that were made by Rose King in her
deposition concerning her property boundaries, which at best only indirectly relates to the location
of King Lane:
A.
It goes right where it is today. It is the same spot. It hasn't moved.
That lane goes to where the fence - - the gate is because those fences are all the
border lines. When we bought the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where we
live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they took us around to show us the
borderline, and if you will look, the fence goes all the way across what's between Cal
and Susie's and then it comes right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That same
fence. And then it turns and goes south.
(R., pg. 561; Deposition of Rose King at pp. 15-16, R, pg. 574). 2

The August 12, 2015 Declaration of Matthew Cleverley submitted the Deposition
Excerpts of Gilbert and Rose King to the district court in support of the Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, and it is a part of the record on appeal (R., pp. 614-615). Those deposition excerpts
had been submitted earlier in the action as only attached to the Fuquays' Motion for Reconsideration.
See, Certificate of Service at R., pg. 570. On August 4, 2015 the King Defendants had filed a
Motion to Strike (R., pg. 9) on the basis that while a party is entitled to submit new evidence to the
court on a Rule 11 (a )(2)(B) Motion for Reconsideration, that evidence must be submitted in affidavit
form. See, Franklin Building Supply Co., Inc. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 642, 339 P.3d 357, 367
(2014). In this appellate record those deposition excerpts have been submitted as originally attached
to that motion (R., pp. 571-89).
2
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are defined

prescriptive use

over the statutory

period. Hodgins v. Saies, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). In denying the Fuquay
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration the district court declared:
In this case, it is undisputed that the Kings began improving the roadway,
which is now King Lane, in 1973 to benefit their farming operation. In her affidavit,
Rose King stated that at the time of their purchase of this property in 1973, "King
Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet and muddy most of the
year. . . . We desired to access our fields through the use of this filed [sic, "field"]
lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks to build a base for this road so that it would
be passable for our farm equipment. We did this annually .... " Affidavit of Rose
King, pg. 2, filed Dec. 9, 2014. Thus, the Kings constructed the roadway for their
own use and convenience. The law applicable here is that "the mere use thereof by
others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of
license or permission." Simmons v. Perkins, supra. Therefore, the permissive
presumption is applicable here.
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6, 2015, at pp. 6-7
(R., pp. 634-35).
In bringing this appeal the Fuquays have made no mention whatsoever of the fact that the
current King Lane, as suitable for their alleged claimed prescriptive uses, was first built by the Kings
in 1973. As the district court found, prior to the 1973 construction of King Lane, it had only been
a path through grass and weeds and was wet and muddy most the year. (R., pg. 634). Yet that very
fact - the construction of King Lane in 1973 and the "non-interfering use by the Fuquays of that
roadway subsequent to their purchase of the adjoining property in 1977 - figured very prominently
in the decision of the district court in denying the Fuquays' request for a prescriptive easement in that
roadway.
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The only evidence of an adverse use and decisive act occurred
2011 when the
plaintiffs increased large commercial truck traffic over King Lane. However, that
adverse use places the prescriptive easement claim within the twenty year statutory
period.
Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration at pg. 8 (R., pg. 543).
As the district court found, as is pointed out further below, the Fuquays' own evidence and
testimony established that they had not interfered in any way with the Kings' use of King Lane after
1977. The Fuquays have simply predicated their arguments advanced on this appeal upon ignoring
the critical fact that the Kings constructed the roadway now known as King Lane in 1973, which in
fact has made their claimed prescriptive uses of that road possible. On this appeal the Fuquays have
strenuously attempted to allege that their actions constituted "distinct acts of adverse use,"
(Appellant's Brief at pp. 20-25), but all of those actions in using King Lane were simply found by
the district court to be "non-interfering" uses, as based upon the Fuquays' own testimony, under the

Simmons rule, as more fully addressed below, and were deemed to be a permissive "use in common."
The foundation of the "joint-use-in-common" rule, which was the basis for the district court's
decision below, is the 75 year-old decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Simmons v. Perkins, 63
Idaho 136, 118 P .2d 7 40 ( 1941 ), in which the Court had first set out supporting authority from a
number of sister states in support of that rule, which decision since that time has been consistently
followed in this jurisdiction, having been most recently cited and followed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,503,236 P.3 1257, 1263 (2010). As originally
stated by the Court in 1941, in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), the rule was
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set out as
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs
a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which
in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or
permission. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291; Howard v. Wright,
38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 1184; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 lowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Burk v.
Diers, 102 Neb. 721, 169N.W. 263; Longv. Mayberry, 96 Tenn. 378, 36 S.W. 1040;
Parish v. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586, 10 N.E. 109; Null v. Williamson, 166 Ind. 537, 78
N.E. 76; Gascho v. Lennert, 176 Ind. 677, 97 N.E. 6; Kilburn v. Adams, 48 Mass. 33,
7 Met. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; 18 C. J., sec. 120, p. 105.
The use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general public,
in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and
exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption of individual right therein
in his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 631, 66 P. 10; Heenan v. Bevans, 51
Cal.App. 277, 196 P. 802; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Pirman
v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7 N.E.2d 262,264.
An individual using land as a road in common with the public cannot
acquire a prescriptive right of way against the owner. Thornley Land & Livestock
Co. v. Morgan Bros., 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7
N.E.2d 262; 111 A. L. R., Extended Annotation, p. 221.
The rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen
into a right by prescription unless it constitutes some actual invasion or
infringement of the rights of the owner. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 P.
491; Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind.App. 119, 133 N.E. 156; 19 C. J. 887,
sec. 52, Citations, Note 74.
63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744 (emphasis added). In this case the district court specifically found
that beginning in 1977 the Fuquay Appellants had commenced a non-interfering use-in-common of
King Lane - conducted along with non-interfering use by members of the general public (R., pp.
542-45).
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Idaho Court of Appeals in Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401, 724 P.2d 1

(Ct.App.

1986) engrafted the above-stated rule from Simmons v. Perkins as an additional exception to the
general rule that where there is no evidence as to how the use began, then that use raises a
nresumntion that it was adverse and under a claim of
rio-ht The
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summarized the Simmons exception within this specific context as follows:
Our Supreme Court has also recognized that the general rule has another exception
which is applicable in the absence of evidence as to whether the use began adversely
or with permission of the servient owner. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144,
118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941) the Court said:
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs
a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others
which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of
license or permission. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 Pac. 291;
Howard v. Wright, 38 Nev. 25, 143 Pac. 1184; [additional citations omitted].
Other states which currently recognize this rule include Colorado, Nevada,
Oregon, and Utah. See, e.g., Allen v. First National Bank ofArvada, 120 Colo. 275,
208 P.2d 935 (1949); Westland Nursing Home, Inc. v. Benson, 33 Colo.App. 245,
517 P.2d 862 (1974); Jackson v. Hicks, 95 Nev. 826,604 P.2d 105 (1979); Woods
v. Hart, 254 Or. 434, 458 P.2d 945 (1969); and Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514,
175 P.2d 714 (1946). See also Annot. 170 A.L.R. 776, at 825. In Jackson v. Hicks,
604 P.2d at 106, the Nevada Supreme Court, quoting from Turrillas v. Quilici, 72
Nev.289, 303 P.2d 1002 (1956), stated the rule as follows:

Where a roadway is established or maintained by a landowner for his
own use, the fact that his neighbor also makes use of it, under circumstances
which in no way interfere with use by the landowner himself, does not
create a presumption of adverseness. The presumption is that the neighbor's
use is not adverse but is permissive and the result of neighborly
accommodation on the part of the landowner.
111 Idaho at 404, 724 P .2d at 140 (emphasis added). The only evidence in the record before this
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on this appeal is the declaration made by Rose

her affidavit that

to the Kings'

reconstruction and improvement of that road in 1973 "King Lane was only a path through grass and
weeds and was set and muddy most of the year .... " (Rose King Aff., i12, R., pg. 230; District
Court Memorandum Decision, R., pg. 634). Under the Court's statement in Melendez this conduct
by the Kings in constructing King Lane in 1973 was sufficient to raise a presumption of permissive
use by the Fuquays, so long as their use remained non-interfering, which it did until 2011 (R., pg.
543), a time that is well outside the scope of the Fuquays' five year prescriptive use claims that were
made in the action below.
The Idaho Court of Appeals continued to adhere to the Melendez statement of the "joint-usein-common rule" in its subsequent decisions as one of two recognized exceptions to the general rule
that when where there is no evidence as to how the use began, then a presumption arises that the use
is adverse and under a claim ofright. See, Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho 901,903, 781 P.2d 238,240
(Ct.App.1989); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13, 784 P.2d 339, 343 (Ct.App.1989); Chen v.

Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 1010, 829 P.2d 1335, 1359 (Ct.App.1991); and Burns v. Alderman, 122
Idaho 749,754,838 P.2d 878,883 (Ct.App.1992).
In 1997 the Idaho Supreme Court incorporated the Court of Appeal's Melendez analysis in

Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997):
Generally, proof of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the
way for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises a
presumption that the use was adverse and under claim of right. Deer Creek, 94 Idaho
at 534-35, 493 P.2d at 393-94. Proof of all of these elements shifts the burden to the
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owner
the servient estate, who must demonstrate that the claimant's use was
permissive.
at 534-35, 493 P.2d at 393-94. This Court has articulated exceptions
to this general rule. The exceptions allow a party to rebut the presumption of adverse
use in order to demonstrate that the use was permissive. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63
Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), for example, this Court held that "use of a driveway
in common with the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive
use nn his nart neP-Mives
act on the user's vart indicatinfY a sevarate and exclusive--------··--r-------o----·-any presumption of individual right therein in his favor." Id. at 144, 118 P .2d at 744
(emphasis added). This Court further explained in Simmons that use of a roadway
must invade or infringe on the owner's rights in order for the use to be considered
adverse and, thus, to ripen into a prescriptive right of way. Id. at 144, 118 P.2d at
744.
.1..

<J

.1

---------

130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980 (italicized emphasis in original).
Since the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Blair, it has on at least twomore occasions addressed the question of the application of the "joint-use-in-common rule" in terms
which have specific application to the argument that has been raised by the Fuquay Appellants on
this appeal. In Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008) the Court summarized its
application of this rule as earlier addressed Simmons, Marshall, and in particular, as clarified in its
decision in Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 (2006):
In Idaho, the adverse use presumption has been rebutted by evidence of "use of a
driveway in common with the owner and the general public, in the absence of some
decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and exclusive use . ... "
Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980 (quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho
136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941)) (emphasis removed); see also Hughes v. Fisher,
142 Idaho 474,481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (2006).
A second exception to the adverse use presumption has been applied in Idaho:
when "a landowner 'constructs a way over [the land] for his own use and
convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his
use will be presumed to be by way of ... permission.'" Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481,
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129
at 1230 (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744) (alteration
original). In Hughes, the parties cited these exceptions and argued over whether
the presumptions applied, whether the burdens shifted, and whether the latter
exception applies when the owner did not construct the way over the land. Id.
This Court held those two rules were simply an approach to determining whether the
claimant had met the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing
eviclen~e

Td. The C:m1rt i;;:t:::ite.l :::i .lei;;:ire to ".lii;;:ent:::ingle T,faho prei;;:rriptive e:::ii;;:ement

law" and "emphasize[d] the need for courts to streamline their analysis by focusing
simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied based
on the facts before them." Id. Here, the district court found that the Becksteads did
not seek or obtain permission from the Prices to use the road and that the Prices
recognized the Becksteads' right to use the road. There was evidence the
Becksteads' use of the road was adverse and under a claim ofright. To the degree
there was conflicting evidence, it was the province of the district court to weigh that
evidence. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. The district court's
findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
146 Idaho at 64, 190 P .3d at 883 (emphasis added).
The ultimate effect ofthe Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Beckstead and Hughes, appears
to be that the "joint-use-in common rule" has application both on the basis as that rule was originally
stated in the 1941 Simmons decision as a free-standing rule of easement law that when a landowner
constructs a roadway for his own use and convenience, which thereafter is used without interference
by a neighboring landowner, that use will be presumed to be permissive, and also as an exception
to adverse-use presumption rule, when applicable as based upon the facts presented.
On this appeal the Fuquay Appellants have attempted to claim the benefit of an alleged
presumption of adverse use to King Lane as based upon an allegation that it is unknown when any
first use of King Lane began. See, Appellant's Brief pp. 12-13. The essential problem with this
argument is that the Fuquays have not provided any evidence of any actual prior use of King Lane
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any of their predecessors. They rely only upon vague statements made in a deposition excerpt
Rose King, and upon the indefinite statements made as to use of King Lane included in Sam
Steiner's affidavit- and nothing more. Certainly a prescriptive right claimant is entitled to tack his
claim with that of a predecessor. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003)
("Tacking is the concept that allows the current owner to combine his or her prescriptive use with
that of a previous owner, in order to meet the five-year statutory requirement."). But on the facts of
this case, the evidence presented establishes neither the existence of any roadway at the location of
King Lane that would support the type and kind of prescriptive easement claims made by the Fuquay
Appellants, nor that any such "uses" were ever made of any such roadway at any time by the
Fuquays' alleged predecessors. See e.g., Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 503, 236 P.3d
1257, 1263 (2010) ("The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party
cannot raise a question of fact for an element that it would have to establish at trial. ... Prior to the
mid-l 980s, the road was overgrown and hardly accessible by vehicle.").
Even if there were evidence in the record before this Court to substantiate the Fuquays'
claims -which there is not - that evidence would have no effect upon the district court's findings
that it was the very fact of the King's construction of the current all-weather King Lane in 1973, as
suitable for year-round use, that is the basis upon which the permissive use by the Fuquays arose
under the Simmons rule. The Kings simply constructed and maintained an all-weather roadway
suitable for year-round use, which their neighbors used on a non-interfering basis. ("Simply put, the
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have

no

their use

King

Kings rights.

R., pg. 635).
Because any right gained by prescription is confined to only the extent of that right as it was
exercised during the prescriptive period, West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 556, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333
(1973), at best even if the Fuquay Appellants had produced any evidence of their predecessors use,
they could only claim the benefit of any prescriptive right that had ripened prior to the Kings'
construction of the current roadway in 1973, if in fact they were able to present that evidence, which
they have not done. There was simply no roadway other than the muddy tract testified to by Rose
King, and virtually no use - certainly no use of the continuous and uninterrupted variety necessary
to establish a prescriptive easement.
As the district court ruled, as based upon an application of the Simmons case, the Fuquays
own vehicular-use based prescriptive use claims to King Lane have all been asserted after the Kings
constructed that roadway in 1973. ("In this case, it is known when the Fuquays' use of King Lane
began, 1977. When the Kings acquired their property in 1973, they took steps to improve the
roadway. Thereafter, Jim Fuquay acquired his property in 1977, placed a mobile home on his
property and began using King Lane at that time." (R., pg. 634)). The Fuquays' own testimony as
submitted at the September 18, 2014 preliminary injunction hearing, as also extensively quoted on
the face of the district court's June 19, 2015 memorandum decision, stated that they made no
interfering use of King Lane (R., pp. 543-45).
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All of the Fuquays' use of King Lane has been permissive under the "joint-use-in-common
rule," during the entire period of the of their alleged five year prescriptive use claim as pled in their
complaint. (Amended Complaint, 1 16, "since at least 1989," R., pg. 436), and as supported by the
testimony they had provided at the preliminary injunction hearing, (Exh. A, Farris Aff. R., Sept. 18,
2014 Tr., pp. 4-125., pp. 243-72), and as supported by the Declaration of John Fuquay (R., pg. 201214). As the Kings argued to the district court below, the only issues to be considered on a motion
for summary judgment are those that have been raised by the pleadings (R., pp. 504-05), citing to

Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396,405,299 P.3d 203,212 (2013); but see,
Skinner v. US Bank Home Mortgage, 159 Idaho 642, 650 n. 2, 365 P.3d 398, 406 n. 2 (2016).
As argued before the district court, once that joint-use-in-common of King Lane had been
established after the Kings had constructed the current road in 1973, then the burden was upon the
Fuquays to thereafter to establish a change to adverse use as stated in HF.LP. v. City ofTwin Falls,
157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557 (2014):
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and
"brought home" to the servient prope1iy owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d
631, 634 (1975).
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566.
In sum, there is simply no evidence in the record before this Court on this Appeal that
supports the conclusion that the district court erred. The Fuquay Appellants only ask this Court to
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reverse the district court on the very same evidence, and on the very same arguments that have
already been rejected below. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court.

B.

The Respondent Kings Are Entitled To An Award Of Costs Under Idaho Appellate
Rule 40, And An Award Of Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 12-121 On This Appeal
Should the King Respondents be the prevailing party on this appeal then they request an

award of their costs under Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
In addition, should the King Respondents be the prevailing party on this appeal then they
request an award of their attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121, as provided by Idaho Appellate Rule
41(a).
Any award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party under LC. § 12-121 is discretionary, Jim
& Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 935, 342 P.3d 639, 647 (2015). A

prevailing party seeking an award of attorney's fees must support that claim with both argument and
supporting legal authority. Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223,228,254 P.3d 1219, 1224 (2011). The
appellate rules require that the argument shall contain the respondent's contentions, the reasons
therefor, in addition to citations to those parts of the transcript and the record relied upon. Sherman

Storage, LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions JI, LLC, 159 Idaho 331, 339, 360 P.3d 340,348 (2015).
Generally, an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 is inappropriate
where a party does nothing more than make a request by merely citing to the code section, but then
fails to provide any significant argument as to why it is entitled to an award of fees. Bagley v.

Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,805,241 P.3d 972,978 (2010). In order for the responding party on an
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appeal to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees under

§ 1 121 the

must

left with

an abiding belief that the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation. Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280,286,311 P.3d 292,298 (2013). The entire appeal
must have been pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Bagley v. Thomason,
155 Idaho 193,198,307 P.3d 1219, 1224 (2013).
On this appeal the Fuquay Appellants have advanced the exact same argument that they made
on reconsideration before the district court that they were entitled a presumption of adverseness
based upon evidence that it was not known when the use of King Lane began. (R., pp. 548-570; pp.
616-621). The district court rejected that argument because the undisputed evidence established
King Lane itself, as a roadway suitable for vehicular traffic within the nature and scope of the
Fuquays' claim prescriptive uses, was first built by the Kings in 1973.

(R., pp. 634-35)

Furthermore, the district court found no evidence in the record before it, or that is in the record
before this Court on this appeal, which supports any claimed use of King Lane other than the use that
was commenced by the Fuquays in 1977. (R., pg. 634 "In this case, it is known when the Fuquays'
use of King Lane began, 1977.") The Fuquays use, being non-interfering and in common with that
of the Kings and Lows, was deemed to be permissive as a matter of law under the rule of law first
announced 75 years ago in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740 (1941), and was
reaffirmed by Idaho's high court as recently as, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,503,236
P .3d 1257, 1263 (2010) ('" [W]here the owner ofreal property constructs a way over it for his use
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convenience, the mere use thereof

others which

no way interferes with his use will be

presumed to be by way oflicense or permission.' Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1005, 829 P.2d
1349, 1354 (Ct.App.1992) (quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744
(1941)).''),
On this appeal, the Fuquay Appellants have advanced no argument, nor advanced any rule
of law, nor have they pointed to any evidence in the record, that would support overturning the
district court's decision, that they have not already raised before the district court below, nor have
they made any cogent or logical argument as to why the district court erred, as based upon the
evidence presented and law that was argued below that court. Instead, the Fuquays have simply
ignored a critical undisputed fact underlying the district court's decision below, which was the
Kings' construction of the current King Lane in 1973 which made that roadway suitable for yearround vehicle use, including farm vehicles, and then by further improvements, large trucks in 1989.
This roadway's construction and the associated improvements invoked the "use in common" rule
of Simmons v. Perkins, which was properly applied to the facts of this case. As the Idaho Supreme
Court recently declared in, Thornton v. Pandrea,

Idaho -, - P.3d - ,2016WL4811064(2016):

"The Court will award fees to a prevailing party under Idaho Code section 12121 when the Court believes that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Sweet, 159 Idaho at 767,367 P.3d
at 162 (internal quotation omitted). In an appeal where the prevailing party sought
attorney fees under section 12-121, the Court granted fees where the nonprevailing
party "continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of the district
court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt
the existing law on which the district court based its decision." Castrigno v.
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McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106
419,424 (2005). The nonprevailing parties
"may have had a good faith basis to bring the original suit based on
interpretation of Idaho law" but "it was frivolous and unreasonable to make a
continued argument" by appealing the district court's decision when on appeal "they
failed to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below." Id.
?.O 16 WT.4811064 ::it

* 1 R (Pmph::i-:i-: ::irlrlPrl).

The Fuquay Appellants have done nothing more than advance the same arguments and same
facts that were advanced before the district court, without alleging why or on what basis that court
erred in the law applied, or failed to consider any applicable evidence. Under the standard stated in
Thornton v. Pandrea, and upon the general standards applicable to awards of attorney's fees under

I.C. § 12-121 as cited above, the King Respondents are entitled to an award of their attorney's fees
underl.C. § 12-121 on this appeal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the Fuquay Appellants'
claim for prescriptive easement over King Lane, and grant the Respondents an award of attorney's
fees under LC.§ 12-121.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day ofNove;~;:,_2011>:-·-,

I
Attorney for the Respondents
Heart K Ranch
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